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Europe, Philosophy 
and Cultural Diversity: 
An Introduction
We live in communities where people from very different geographical, cultural, 
ethnic and religious backgrounds must coexist. This constitutes a challenge for 
our institutions, for individual members of our communities, for intermediate 
bodies, such as families, schools, businesses, professional associations, and so on. 
People from different backgrounds have differences in expectations and sensi-
tivities. These differences tend to be greater than those existing among people 
from the same background. These differences can make individual and collective 
choices difficult, they can make understanding of others’ intentions problematic, 
and they can jeopardize our ability to foresee the actions and the reactions of oth-
ers. This condition puts our practical reasons under considerable stress and we 
need to face this question: how can we best deploy our cognitive and volitional 
capacities, in order to overcome the challenges that we need to face?
A dominant way of answering this question contends that, in our practical 
deliberations, we should bracket all aspects of reality and all considerations that 
are individual and pertain only to the deliberating subject. By ‘bracket’ we do 
not mean “completely ignore”, we just mean that we are called to give priority 
to what is universal and can be accepted and recognised by everyone. This con-
viction depends on a conception of practical rationality which postulates that 
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the good is wholly subjective, i.e. relative to either individuals or societies (Raw-
ls 1971/1998; Habermas 1981). This leading framework of practical rationality 
hopes to show that, by assuming a subjectivist view of rationality, clashes between 
the diverse positions upheld in complex contemporary societies may be prevent-
ed. Discussions about policy-making and public decisions in multicultural soci-
eties normally start from the assumption of this notion of rationality (Kymlicka 
1996, 2007). This perspective, however, proves to be deficient from the point of 
view of fostering convergence of identities into unified and harmonious commu-
nities. It leads namely to fragmented communities, instead of providing the con-
ditions where people may gradually converge on a shared view of what is worth 
achieving as a community. One might suppose that the defect of this conception 
depends on the assumption of an anti-realist view of reason, including practical 
reason, which is now widely criticised. The view also overlooks the fact that em-
pirical sciences (evolutionary psychology, ethology, etc.) suggest that some moral 
capacities are deeply rooted in our biological nature (Boniolo and De Anna 2006; 
De Waal 1998; Illies 2006; Hösle and Illies 2005).
The limitations of the mentioned, dominant conception of practical reason, 
and the relevance of current debates on realism and on the biological roots of 
ethics for overcoming those limitations were discussed as part of a project enti-
tled “Moral realism and political decisions: a new framework of practical ratio-
nality for contemporary multicultural Europe”. The project was funded by the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) in the scheme “Hochschul-
dialog mit Südeuropa 2013” and was carried out in 2013-2014 by a group of 
scholars from the Universities of Bamberg (Germany), Trieste (Italy) and Udine 
(Italy). The results of the research work were published in a volume of collected 
essays entitled Moral Realism and Political Decisions. Practical Rationality in Con-
temporary Public Contexts (De Anna and Martinelli 2015).
The essays in Moral Realism and Political Decisions aimed at outlining a frame-
work of practical rationality for public discussions and political decisions, capable 
of bringing together the diverse perspectives coexisting in current multicultural 
societies, especially in Europe, and at helping to develop shared solutions, values, 
and institutions. The main idea was grounded on achievements attained in two 
current debates in philosophy: the debate on “new realism” and the debate on the 
ethical relevance of recent achievements in biological sciences.
Debates on “new realism” ensue from the work of contemporary philoso-
phers such as Hilary Putnam (1999), John McDowell (1998, 2004), Thomas 
Nagel (1986), etc. Unlike the old, naïve versions of realism, “new realism” rejects 
the possibility of an absolute perspective on reality, while maintaining that our 
cognitive efforts are at least partly constrained by objective reality. The moral 
upshot is that the good is not merely a subjective or social construction, but 
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it is the result of typically human responses to the demands of a reality that is 
structured in a certain way, and, due to its structure, has built-in possibilities of 
perfection. There is no absolute conception of the good, but features of reality 
can still be criteria for practical rationality and for the aptness of human subjec-
tive responses in difficult decision-making situations (Putnam 2002, 2004; Nagel 
1979; McDo well 1998). In Italy, these debates have recently taken an original 
direction, which is now contributing to the wider international scientific com-
munity (De Caro and Ferraris 2012; Ferraris 2012; Possenti and Lavazza 2013).
Discussions about the ethical relevance of recent findings in biological scienc-
es suggest that there are many homologies between human and animal behaviour, 
to the extent that it can hardly be denied that morality is deeply grounded in our 
animal nature, contra many subjectivist claims. On the other hand, transcenden-
tal considerations suggest that human reasoning can justify the normativity of 
ethically guided action in humans. Again, this suggests a notion of ethics which 
is objectivistic and anti-absolutistic at the same time (Illies 2003, 2006; Nagel 
1986, 2012).
The political upshots of these converging revolutions in epistemology and in 
ethics are still the object of discussion. Most importantly, the recognition that 
human practical rationality is ruled by what agents conceive as good has im-
portant implications on the notions of political authority and consent. On the 
one hand, against subjectivist views of the good, the new framework purports 
that arguments about what is good can have a justificatory and legitimating role 
in the practices of political decision-making and in the formation of consent. 
On the other hand, against old-style realist views, the new framework denies 
that there is an absolute conception of the good, and is thereby sensitive to the 
subjective positions of those who have to consent to political authority: this sets 
limits to political authority. Breaking those limits would constitute a violation of 
the humanity of those subject to authority, would progressively undermine their 
consent, and hence destroy the both the very strength of authority in question, 
as well as the community itself (De Anna 2012a, 2012b; Besussi 2012, 2013). 
This outlook also implies a critical reassessment of many post-Enlightenment as-
sumptions that characterise European identity, and of the diverse modalities with 
which the encounter between different cultures was dealt with in the long history 
of Europe. The Enlightenment helped to overcome theological arguments for the 
objective nature of the good and to recognize the legitimacy of different cultures 
within a wider anthropological, rather than metaphysical perspective. Yet, this 
ended by fostering idealistic (i.e. strongly anti-realistic) world-views (Martinelli 
2004, 2010). Nevertheless, it can be argued that cultural pluralism does not nec-
essarily imply idealism and that realism does not necessarily deny the legitimacy 
of cultural diversity.
10G. DE ANNA, R. MARTINELLI
The essays in Moral Realism and Political Decisions contributed to this debate, 
by focusing on the consequences of the realist outlook of practical rationality in 
the arrangements and methods of public and political discussions in contempo-
rary multicultural societies. The ensuing framework of practical rationality can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, practical rationality does not necessarily involve 
general moral statements, or metaphysical statements about the underpinnings 
of morality, but it does necessarily involve reasons for action which an agent 
can recognise as compelling in a practical situation. Secondly, metaphysical con-
siderations might be relevant in a practical context when one tries to justify an 
action or to make a choice, even if they are not a necessary prerequisite of prac-
tical rationality. Thirdly, knowledge about states of affairs subsistent in reality 
might be practically relevant, since such states of affairs can become propositional 
contents of reasons for action. Fourthly, practical rationality is limited by the 
epistemic standpoint of the agent, but also by his/her defects in reasoning and 
in habits. Fifthly, practical rationality is shaped also by pragmatic conditions: 
moral language and institutions built by the linguistic community contribute to 
our practical agency. Sixthly, the upshot of the above considerations concerning 
practical rationality is that practical argumentation in multicultural settings is a 
fallible but reliable possibility when parties try to explain each other the states 
of affairs that constitute their reasons for action. Argumentation is possible and 
reliable, since reasons for action have an objective content (point 3) and practical 
rationality is not about underlying world-views (point 1), but it is fallible since 
practical rationality is limited by the shortcomings of individual agents (point 4) 
or groups (point 5). When different groups within the same society attempt to 
share their purposes, it is also possible that a theoretical agreement is found by 
rational means (point 2).
This summary attempts to draw a common denominator among the different 
voices which found expression in Moral Realism and Political Decisions. Although 
the voices maintained their individuality, discussions and attempts to reach 
shared solutions led to a convergence, which the proposed summary attempts to 
capture.
Moral Realism and Political Decisions is not an isolated case: the practical conse-
quences and the public significance of a moderately realist conception of the good 
have recently become a common topic of discussion. The American philosopher 
Melissa Lane, for example, has recently argued that we cannot face global challeng-
es, such as the environmental crisis, unless we recognize that there are goods which 
humans can recognize and share (Lane 2011). The French philosopher Jean-Marc 
Ferry has also contended that contemporary multicultural Europe faces challenges 
which require a re-evaluation of the leading paradigms and of their subjectivist 
assumptions about freedom, action and normativity (Ferry 2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
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The framework proposed by Moral Realism and Political Decisions, hence offers 
timely and original contributions to a growing current debate.
Encouraged by these considerations, the editors of that volume decided to 
continue the investigation in a new project aimed at considering how the frame-
work of practical rationality outlined in Moral Realism and Political Decisions 
could be applied in current practical quarrels among diverse traditions facing 
each other in European communities. Hence, they (together with Professor Sal-
vatore Lavecchia, of the University of Udine) applied for and obtained a new 
grant from DAAD in the scheme “Hochschuldialog mit Südeuropa 2014-2015”. 
The project was entitled “Practical rationality in political contexts: facing diversi-
ty in contemporary multicultural Europe”, and included the researchers involved 
in the previous project, with the addition of some new entries. The research work 
culminated in a workshop which took place at the University of Trieste, 18-21st 
December 2014. The essays here collected contain the result of that work. This 
is not a collection of conference contributions, but a collection of original essays 
which were written after the workshop, as a consequence of the discussions held 
at that occasion.
The essays focus on various sorts of cultural diversities concerning Europe: 
diversities within Europe (among different European traditions, among Euro-
pean heritage and the heritages of new inhabitants of Europe) and diversities 
concerning the relation between Europe and other regions of the world. How can 
the conclusions about practical rationality in the public sphere arrived at in Moral 
Realism and Political Decisions change our traditional ways of approaching those 
diversities? This question was addressed by paying attention to the anthropologi-
cal and pragmatic presuppositions of attempts to seek practical agreement across 
different cultures, by reflecting on the pragmatic role of institutions in fostering 
the deliberative processes required for addressing issues related to cultural diver-
sity, and by considering cases of clashes among diversities, both within Europe 
and in the relations among different world regions. 
In “Some Critical Questions about Critical Questions”, Thomas Becker dis-
cusses one of the main problems of argumentation theory: the evaluation of ar-
guments in practical contexts. Unlike theoretical contexts, in which the mere 
appeal to hidden premises can be sufficient to highlight the validity or invalidity 
of arguments, practical contexts require that the efficacy of an argument also be 
measured in terms of the appeal that the premises, both explicit and implicit, may 
have on the addressee(s). In his paper, Becker argues that the Critical Questions 
analysis of argumentation by Walton, Reed and Macagno is a valuable tool with 
which to access an argumentation in a practical context. He also contends that 
the practical relevance that the critical questions might have calls for differentia-
tion among different kinds of critical questions and different roles that they can 
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play in the evaluation of the practical efficacy of an argumentation. The present 
article is a draft that Professor Becker had already completed by the end of Au-
gust 2014, in view of the workshop, which was meant to take place in Trieste in 
September 2014, and which was subsequently rescheduled in December of that 
year. His sudden and tragic decease did not allow him to complete his work and 
to present and discuss it at the workshop. The draft had nonetheless already a 
complete and conclusive structure. Furthermore, it takes on and develops some 
of the topics that Professor Becker had already discussed with the other members 
of the research group in the workshop of the previous year. These reasons fully 
justified the inclusion of the draft in this collection. The draft has been edited 
by Sebastian Krebs, who was Professor Becker’s assistant at Bamberg University.
Sebastian Krebs, in “Does Truth Really Matter? On the Irrelevance of Truth”, 
acknowledges a huge gap between traditional inconclusive theorizing about truth 
and the need for solutions to fundamental practical challenges, which seems to 
require a commitment to truth. Krebs tries to overcome the gap by appealing to 
Thomas Becker’s position on truth, a position that Krebs calls relevantism. The 
point is that philosophical truth is not the concept that we appeal to in addressing 
our practical concerns: we de facto prefer a relevant sentence to a true sentence. 
Krebs addresses the objection that relevantism entails relativism and offers some 
examples aimed at showing how Becker’s relevantist program can be employed to 
address practical issues in multicultural contexts.
In his essay “On the Philosophical Significance of National Characters. Re-
flections from Hume and Kant”, Riccardo Martinelli addresses the problem of 
how to cope with national differences philosophically. The topic is undoubtedly 
thorny, there being a number of reasons to distrust the notion of national char-
acter altogether. Talk about national characters, in fact, may appear to roam 
below the threshold of any respectable philosophical argumentation. What is 
worse, folk beliefs concerning national characters have been occasionally steered 
to foster hostility or prejudice against foreign nations. Nevertheless, Martinelli 
argues, the philosophical significance of national characters can be defended, in 
the wake of Hume and Kant. Interestingly, both great thinkers did not shy away 
from explaining what makes up a national character. Typically, they dealt with 
this topic within the context of a broader analysis of the concept of “charac-
ter”, which is a widely debated philosophical issue. Taking the existence of some 
general differences among collective entities (such as nations) for granted, and 
yet sticking to the moral principle of individual responsibility, Hume and Kant 
developed different philosophical explanations for national characters, illustrated 
and discussed by Martinelli.
The essay “Individual actions and shared actions: an interactional framework” 
by Marianna Ginocchietti deals with implications of multiculturalism for shared 
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actions. The essay discusses the notion of individual action and claims that an 
interactional framework is needed in order to understand both individual and 
shared actions. Ginocchietti contends that we need a notion of individual action 
which must be consistent with the agent’s concrete exercise of her agency and 
with the ways which agents attribute agency to others. Such a notion must be 
non-reductive and can lead to an understating of shared action in terms of “joint 
commitment”.
In the essay “Rationality in linguistic interpretation: from charity to cooper-
ativeness”, Paolo Labinaz deals with two principles that have significant conse-
quences on discussions about multiculturalism and the possibility of a universal 
reason: the principle of charity and the principle of cooperation. The Author 
criticizes the role that the many versions of the principle of charity accord to 
rationality and proposes an alternative view based on Paul Grice’s cooperative 
principle and his argumentative conception of rationality. According to the prin-
ciple of charity, assuming that people are rational is a necessary condition of the 
possibility of interpreting their linguistic behaviour successfully: we could not 
understand other people’s utterances without assuming a certain degree of ra-
tionality on their part. By contrast, Labinaz rejects the principle of charity, since 
it cannot specify how much rationality speakers have to be granted. Following 
Grice, Labinaz claims that the rationality of speakers does not need to be con-
ceived in terms of conformity to certain norms, but emerges from the linguistic 
practices as a concern for the justification of the speaker’s own utterances.
Multiculturalism raises the problem of the extent to which cultures can dif-
fer if they have to coexist. Recently, some theorists (including Regina Schwartz 
and Jan Assmann) have contended that religious differences represent a serious 
danger for the coexistence of cultures. The essay “Nicholas of Cusa. Natural Law, 
Religions, and Peace: facing Diversity through Philosophy in Pre-Modern Eu-
rope”, which is authored by Marko Fuchs, challenges that position. Fuchs shows 
that Cusa made room for the possibility of different religions peacefully coex-
isting, without having to give up their differences. In order to make his point, 
Fuchs discusses the notion of ‘peace of faith’ and offers an interpretation of the 
main arguments that Cusa set forth in his De pace fidei. Fuchs argues that Cusa’s 
solution can be effectively employed against contemporary objections to religious 
pluralism.
The essay entitled “The challenge of multiculturalism: universalism and par-
ticularism in Alasdair MacIntyre’s ethics”, written by Ines Potzernheim, puts 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s ethical theory, as laid down in After Virtue, towards a proof 
of the conditions of a multicultural society. Potzernheim examines the particu-
laristic and universalistic aspects of MacIntyre’s approach and analyses the im-
plications that arise for multiculturalism. The essay argues that MacIntyre has 
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an implicit universal notion of virtue ethics, which includes certain universal 
ideas concerning the nature of human beings (especially those aspects related to 
human thinking and acting). However, the essay contends that, in relation to the 
challenges to ethical systems in a multicultural society, MacIntyre’s cultural or 
historical particularism does not provide a satisfying perspective.
John Stopford, in his essay entitled “Reason, Recognition, and Diversity”, 
starts from the recognition that liberal democracy is currently faulted – both by 
communitarians and by postmodernists – for ignoring indigenous cultures and 
postcolonial peoples while embracing schemes of economic development that 
disrupt traditional values and ways of life. In his view, liberals must respond to 
such challenges by re-examining the role of culture in liberal political theory. 
Traditionally, political economists could assume social and political institutions 
to be culturally homogenous, all diversities among citizens being reducible to 
matters of preferential rationality. The acknowledgement of current pluralism 
must be a new starting point for liberal political philosophy. Liberal democracy 
can recognize the objectivity of different beliefs about value and reject the use of 
political power to shape citizen’s conceptions of the good, while also recognizing 
the need for political integration. Political integration, however, according to the 
author, is only possible if citizens also assume the burdens of reasonableness when 
the realization of public policies presupposes sustained public commitment over 
time. Citizens “must be prepared to assume these burdens if they are to play their 
role in sustaining and defending democratic institutions”.
In “Politics and the Relevance of Cultures”, Gabriele De Anna contends that 
an engagement in the study of cultural heritages and traditions is essential in con-
structing a shared future in current multicultural societies. De Anna highlights 
that traditional debates between liberals and communitarians have not solved the 
problem of the dichotomy between universalism and cultural-relativism of practical 
reason. Attempts to find practical solutions to the issue, such as traditional multi-
culturalism based on liberal and individualist assumptions, also seem to misrepre-
sent the nature of practical reason. The results of recent debates on practical reason, 
which were revised also in De Anna and Martinelli (2015), open new possibilities 
concerning the possibility of a transcultural employment of practical reason. On 
the basis of recent developments in the field, De Anna contends that the notion 
of a universal human nature is presupposed in the judgements of practical reason, 
although the features of human nature are always thought through from the point 
of view of a particular culture. De Anna concludes that the study of cultures is fun-
damental for learning how to recognise what is really universal in human nature, 
and, therefore, in coping with the challenges of multicultural societies.
Antonella Pocecco, in “The Everyday Multiculturalism: Individual Experi-
ence of Cultural Diversity”, discusses current approaches to the problems arising 
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in our contemporary multicultural societies. She distinguishes two opposing ap-
proaches, which polarise current public debates: the ideology which sees multi-
culturalism as a good to seek and foster, and the ideology which proclaims the 
need to establish and defend individualities and cultural specificities. She argues 
that both extreme ideologies share a common misunderstanding on the notion 
of “culture”: they assume a monolithic view of cultures, whereas each culture is 
manifold by its very nature. She identifies the visibility of multicultural features 
as the characteristic trait of our age, and she deals with the practical problems 
that the current situation raises, the issues of an everyday multiculturalism. The 
notion of a universal conception of reasons, through which all must become 
self-critical and open to receive the good, which may come from others, seems 
the only possible solution to current critical features of society.
The essay “Facing differences and indifference in Mexico: suggestions con-
cerning the discursive dynamics of morality in 2666 by Roberto Bolaño and “El 
principio del placer” and Las batallas en el desierto by José Emilio Pacheco”, by 
Arndt Lainck, offer an interdisciplinary perspective on the issue of multicultural-
ism and practical reasoning. With the help of literary examples, Lainck suggests 
an insight into how discourses on morality shape our conceptualization of moral 
behaviour and have far-reaching pragmatic consequences. In search of a moral 
compass, literary examples presented in the essay pose questions from opposite 
ends of the spectrum. Bolaño’s 2666 is characterized by the manifest absence of 
morality and is set in a post-apocalyptic landscape of a very contemporary mo-
dernity. In the short story “El principio del placer” and in the novel Las batallas 
en el desierto by Pacheco, on the other hand, the narrators try to establish self-de-
veloped points of reference against the daunting imposition of conflicting moral 
codes in the adult world. The antithetical examples used are meant to convey 
a sense of how difficult it is to arrive at moral criteria against the backdrop of 
societies which strongly antagonize moral deviance beyond established practices.
In the essay “The Moral Fable”, Brunello Lotti raises some important issues 
concerning the way in which multiculturalism is interpreted by current political 
institutions, in particular in the European Union, under the assumption of an 
ideological understanding of human rights, which hides, rather than discloses, 
problems concerning the governance of complex societies. On the basis of some 
reflections about the development of liberal and democratic ideals in Europe, 
Lotti laments that the current lack of policies of integration in Europe, in spite 
of massive immigration trends, is due to the neglect of three basic truths, which 
were well known throughout the history of European multiculturalism. Firstly, 
multiculturalism cannot be stretched to the point of denying itself. Secondly, 
dialogue is impossible with those who are not open to it. Thirdly, a political in-
stitution loses its authority if it fails to protect the members of the community. 
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Only the recollection of these truths, according to Lotti, could lead to a political-
ly efficacious form of multiculturalism, capable of securing the values that ground 
Europe and that make it so appealing to those who want to come and live in it 
from other regions.
We would like to thank the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst for sup-
porting the project, which led to the publication of this volume. We would like 
also to thank the Universities of Bamberg, Trieste and Udine for supporting the 
initiatives of the project. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude also to 
Marianna Ginocchietti for her helpful typesetting and to Sarah Pawlett Jackson 
for copyediting the manuscript of this volume: her linguistic comments were 
philosophically enlightened suggestions and they ameliorated not only the lin-
guistic expression, but also the philosophical content of the volume.
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